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CLINE v. FOUNTAIN ROCK CO.
fitness and merchantability of food, and although it appears
that such breaches are rather common occurrences, there
have been only three cases to date going to the Maryland
Court of Appeals utilizing this form of action.85 There is
no apparent reason why the customer does not take advan-
tage of this strict liability (independent of negligence) by
bringing a contract action directly against the dealer,
whether or not the manufacturer is identified. Under
Maryland's rules of procedure,86 it would seem that the
retailer could file a third-party claim against the whole-
saler with whom he is in privity, who in turn could implead
the manufacturer. If recovery by an injured customer is
to be restricted, as a matter of practice, to cases predicated
on negligence, particularly where a more adequate remedy
is available, the desirable social interest of public health
and safety in matters of food may be seriously impaired.
Roy DRAGoNE
Effect Of Plea Of Limitation On Amended Declaration
Cline v. Fountain Rock Lime and Brick Co., Inc.'
This is the second appeal of this case to the Court of
Appeals.2 On January 11, 1952, plaintiff-appellee filed a
declaration in the Circuit Court for Frederick County con-
taining the common counts and a special count that alleged:
"'During the year 1949 the .. .defendant [Cline] agreed
with the plaintiff [Fountain Rock] to lease the plaintiff's
real estate, plant and equipment and to pay the plaintiff for
the same a percentage of profit with guaranteed minimum
amount...' "" The case was removed to Carroll County and
was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff for $7,000. On the first appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court
rested its decision on the fact that the jury was permitted
wGreat Atlantic, Etc. Co. v. Adams, 213 Md. 521, 132 A. 2d 484 (1957) ;
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943), noted 8 Md. L. Rev.
61 (1943) ; Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105 (1938),
where plaintiff was injured by a piece of tin in a sandwich served to him
in defendant's restaurant. The Court held the serving of food in a restau-
rant was not a sale of food and that therefore, breach of implied warranty
was not the appropriate action.
N Supra, n. 34, Rule 315 - Third-Party Practice.
1214 Md. 251, 134 A. 2d 304 (1957).
The first appeal was 210 Md. 78, 122 A. 2d 449 (1956).
"Supra, n. 1, 254.
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to consider evidence of damages which was outside the
scope of the original pleading as particularized.
On October 17, 1956, appellee, upon petition and with
leave of Court, filed a substituted or amended declaration
containing the common counts and also a special count,
which, in addition to setting forth an alleged oral contract,
stated: "that [defendant] accepted the advantages and
profits from the proposed joint adventure and the proposed
lease but failed to pay either a percentage of his profits
or the minimum amount provided for in said proposed
lease."4 To this amended declaration, the defendant filed
the General Issue Plea and three pleas of limitations. The
lower court held the pleas of limitations improper and the
jury found that there was an oral agreement between plain-
tiff and defendant in the year 1949 for the establishment
of a stone business on a fifty-fifty basis and again returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On the second appeal, the case was reversed without a
new trial. The Court held that the original declaration, as
limited by a bill of particulars, set forth an oral lease of
real estate, plant and equipment for profit, while the
amended declaration, by alleging a joint adventure agree-
ment, stated a new cause of action which was barred by
the statute of limitations.
The Maryland Rules allow amendment from one form
of action to another." Thus, in the instant case Fountain
Rock's amendment would normally have permitted the ap-
pellee to attempt to recover on the basis of a joint adven-
ture agreement had such amendment been made during
the statutory period. It is only where the amended plead-
ing states a "new cause of action"6 or a "new theory of
liability"7 and such amendment is made after the period
of limitations has expired that the Maryland courts will
permit a plea of limitations to bar the action as restated.
The Court in the present case refers to Clark on Code
Pleading8 :
"'Where the statute of limitations would bar the
bringing of a new suit at the time an amendment is
offered in the pending suit, the amendment must refer
to the cause of action which was stated in the original
complaint or it will be refused. As in the case of amend-
ments generally, the courts at first considered a change
'Ibid, 256.
Rule 320a (2) : "An action may be amended from one form to another."
* Spencer v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 126 Md. 194, 201, 94 A. 660 (1915).
Schuck v. Bramble, 122 Md. 411, 413, 89 A. 719 (1914).
'(2nd ed. 1947) 729.
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in legal theory only to be a change violating this rule;
but now in all but a few jurisdictions the amendment
is allowed if it refers to the same general aggregate
of operative facts upon which the original complaint
was based.' ""
The key to applying this "relation back" doctrine lies
in determining whether the amended declaration in ques-
tion states a new cause of action or merely refers back to
the same cause of action that was stated in the original
declaration.
Clark's general "aggregate of facts" principle is also the
approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the
problem of when relation back should be allowed to defeat
a plea of limitations. 0 While the Court does cite the Fed-
eral rule in the present case, it cautions against a loose
application of it and specifically rejects the views of an
eminent writer who stated that the Federal Rule "makes
a mere attempt to state a case enough to protect you.""'
Clearly, in the Maryland state courts at least, the original
declaration must state some facts which support the theory
of liability upon which the amendment is based.
'Supra, n. 1, 261: The Court quoted further from Clark, as follows:
"'The term ["cause of action"] should be interpreted as referring to
facts upon which one or more rights of action are based, rather than
the rights themselves. Hence a change in legal theory only should
not be considered the statement of a new cause. And unless there has
been so great a change in the material operative facts that an entirely
different fact situation is presented, the amendment should be al-
lowed. This is the theory of the Federal Rules [F. R. C. P. 15(c)],
which is reached through the device of relating back to the original
complaint or defense any amendment stating a claim or defense aris-
ing out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading".'"
2 POE PRAcTIcE (5th ed. 1925) Sec. 189; 34 AM. Jua. 211, Limitation of
Actions, Secs. 260-262; 54 C. J. S. 320, Limitations of Action, Sec. 279.
"0Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(c), 28 U. S. C. A. (195)
574:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment re-
lates back to the date of the original pleading."
1, Edmunds, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 John Marshall
L. Q. 291, 306 (1939):
"Subdivision c of Rule 15 is designed to accomplish the same pur-
pose as our state Civil Practice Act does with the regard to the
relating back of amendments. But it goes even farther and makes a
mere 'attempt' to state a case enough to protect you. It would be a
most peculiar situation in which you could not say you 'attempted' to
state your cause of action. Hence if you file any pleading at all, you
are guaranteed that the statute of limitations cannot be invoked
against you."
See also: Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5, 15
(1938).
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The Maryland cases do not seem to offer any concrete
tests for determining when the offered amendment states
a cause of action or theory of liability which could not be
found in the "aggregate of facts" originally stated. The
terms are used interchangeably in defining the basis for
allowing a plea of limitations to bar an action when the
amendment has been made after the period of limitations
has expired.12
In Hamilton v. Thirston,'8 where the original declara-
tion stated a suit upon an alleged oral agreement and there
was no count in the declaration on a quantum meruit for
the value of services rendered, the Court held "the present
suit, under the amendment, is an action in assumpsit, on a
quantum meruit, and is a new case."'4 Thus the defendant
was allowed to interpose the plea of limitations and defeat
the amended declaration.
Where the last amendment alleged trespass to real
property and the original declaration stated merely the
negligence of the defendant, the Court spoke of the amend-
ment as proceeding "upon an entirely different theory of
liability" and being based "upon a new cause of action"
which was "equivalent to a new suit" and the defendants
"had the right to interpose the plea of limitations as a
defense to the new case against them.' 15
In a somewhat closer situation in which the Court stated
that it was confining its decision to the facts of the case,
an amendment alleged that a conversion had taken place
when defendant was acting in the capacity of plaintiff's
employee. 6 The original declaration had simply stated
the conversion had taken place while the defendant was
acting in the capacity of a receiving teller of a bank. Since
the amended declaration was not predicated upon the em-
ployment of the defendant by the bank, as were the allega-
tions of the first declaration, the Court held the amendment
set up a new theory of liability.
On the other side of the picture it was held that an
amended bill of particulars permitting proof of damages
of a different character, but which resulted from the same
form of action, did not let in the plea of limitations. 7
Another case allowed an amendment to a declaration and
12 Spencer v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 126 Md. 194, 201, 94 A. 660 (1915);
Schuck v. Bramble, 122 Md. 411, 413, 89 A. 719 (1914).
1194 Md. 253, 51 A. 42 (1902).
"Ibid, 256.
Spencer v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., aupra, n. 12, 201.
Schuck v. Bramble, 8upra, n. 12, 413.1 Middendorf, etc. Co. v. Milburn Co., 137 Md. 583, 113 A. 348 (1921).
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bill of particulars to conform to the proof in a misnomer
situation and the plea of limitations was barred."8 Various
other amendments have been allowed which were held
not to state a new cause of action."9
Further expansion in the allowing of amendments
against pleas of limitations in doubtful change of action
situations will probably have to rely heavily on either
Zier v. Chesapeake Ry. Co.20 or Brooks v. Childress.2
In Zier v. Chesapeake Ry. Co. the Court permitted the
plaintiff to amend an original declaration which had al-
leged negligence on the part of fellow servants, to one
which stated that the defendant was liable in selecting
such fellow servants.
"[T] he original declaration though defective was
founded on the alleged negligence of the defendant.
The fact that the narr was insufficient in law - that it
did not accurately and formally set forth the real cause
of action - did not prevent the suit itself from being
a pending suit wherein the gravamen was the negli-
gence of the defendant.... The statement of the cause
of action was different but the cause of action itself
was identical. Injury resulting in death is what occa-
sioned the suit. The imperfect statement of the case
did not cause the correct statement of it to be a dif-
ferent cause of action. 22
The exact language of the Zier case was used later in
Brooks v. Childress23 which held that a change from an
action predicated upon a father's responsibility for the neg-
ligence of his son based on the father's permission was not
changed by an amendment which sought to hold the father
responsible under the doctrine of imputed negligence.
In the present case the only words in the first declara-
tion which might have indicated a joint adventure were
"to pay ... a percentage of profit. '24 Receipt of a share of
18W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, Use Nelsen, 82 Md. 293, 33 A. 763 (1891).
s In Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 39 A. 2d 789 (1944), no new
cause of action was stated where the first declaration was based upon a
policy holder's assessment made by the directors and ratified by the
Court, and the second declaration was based on an assessment made by
the Court. In Wolf v. Bauereis, 72 Md. 481, 19 A. 1045 (1890), an amend-
ment which omitted a husband (who had abandoned his wife) from a
declaration for injury to her was not founded upon a new cause of action.
so98 Md. 35, 56 A. 385 (1903).
-198 Md. 1, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951).
2 Supra, n. 20, 42-43. The fellow-servant rule prevented liability from
attaching to the master in the first declaration.
Supra, n. 21, 14-15.
214 Md. 251, 254, 134 A. 304 (1957).
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profits in a business, however, is not regarded as prima
facie evidence of either a partnership2 5 or a joint adventure
where the profits are received in payment of rent to a land-
lord. Thus, the original declaration's allegation of an oral
lease, even if not limited by particulars, would probably
have been insufficient to establish a cause of action upon
which a later amendment to a joint adventure could be
based.
Determining what does and what does not constitute a
new cause of action remains a difficult problem. It is clear
that the pleader must set forth some minimum of material
operative facts in the original declaration to which a later
amendment can be said to refer. Just what facts are ma-
terial depends upon the particular right of action upon
which the amender relies and on the nature of the evidence
needed to establish this right of action.
The instant case appears to be significant in that while
it illustrates the Court's general willingness to accept the
"relation back" theory of amendments opposed by a plea
of limitations, it nevertheless requires more than a mere
attempt on the part of the pleader to state a cause of action.
How far one may misstate a cause of action as was done
in Zier v. Chesapeake Ry. Co.26 and Brooks v. Childress"
and still allege enough to constitute a cause of action will
have to be determined by subsequent decisions of the Court.
DOUGLAS R. DUE
56 Md. Code (1957), Art. 73A, See. 7(4)(b).
98 Md. 35, 56 A. 385 (1903).
198 Md. 1, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951).
